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LONDON CONGESTION




A basic economic principle is that consumers should
pay directly for the costs they impose as an incentive
to use resources efficiently. Urban traffic congestion
is often cited as an example:if road space is unpriced
traffic volumes will increase until congestion limits
further growth.For decades economists have recom-
mended road congestion pricing (special tolls for dri-
ving on congested roadways) as a way to encourage
more efficient use of the transport system, and ad-
dress congestion and pollution problems, providing
net benefits to society.
In recent years a few cities have implemented various
forms of congestion pricing, including Singapore,
Orange County (California State Route 91) and the
cities of Trondheim, Oslo, and Bergen in Norway, but
proponents have been frustrated by the political re-
sistance congestion pricing faced in other major cities.
Central London is a particularly suitable city for con-
gestion pricing because of its limited road capacity
(the streets network in the core area has hardly ex-
panded since the medieval ages),and
heavy travel demand result in severe
congestion,plus relatively good trav-
el alternatives, including walking,
taxi, bus and subway services, which
are used by most travelers. Only
about 10 per cent of peak-period
trips were made by private automo-
bile. For decades transport planners
have recommended congestion pric-
ing in central London.
In 2000, London’s political system was restructured
to create a new, elected mayor with new powers to
manage the city’s transport system and raise taxes to
fund transport improvements. Ken Livingstone won
with a platform that included congestion pricing im-
plementation. Revenues are to be used to fund pub-
lic transit improvements.
This plan was criticized by various interest groups,
including politicians,motorist groups and some labor
organizations. The Conservative mayor candidate
promised to end the congestion pricing program if
elected. There are half a dozen daily newspapers
published in London, and many of them were skep-
tical or opposed to the program. However, Mayor
Livingstone, considered a “radical” politician, pro-
ceeded with the charge.
How the program works
Since 17 February 2003 motorists driving in central
London (see Figure) on weekdays between 7:00
a.m. and 6:30 p.m. are required to pay £5, increasing
to £8 in July 2005. There are some exemptions, in-
cluding motorcycles, licensed taxis, vehicles used by
disabled people, some alternative fuel vehicles, bus-
es and emergency vehicles.Area residents receive a
90 percent discount for their vehicles. The charging
area is indicated by roadside signs and symbols
painted on the roadway.The city is currently devel-
oping a plan to expand the charging zone westward
in 2006 or later.
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London Congestion Charging Area Payments can be made at selected retail outlets,pay-
ment machines located in the area, by Internet and
cellular telephone messaging, any time during that
day.Motorists can purchase weekly,monthly and an-
nual passes with modest (15 percent) discounts. A
network of video cameras records the license plate
numbers of vehicles and matches it with the paid list.
The owners of vehicles that have not paid as re-
quired are sent a £80 fine.This fine is reduced to £40
if paid within two weeks,and increases to £120 if not
paid after a month – the same policy for parking
penalties in the inner London area.
The system is considered effective. Approximately
110,000 motorists a day pay the charge (98,000 indi-
vidual drivers and 12,000 fleet vehicles),increasingly
by mobile phone text message. Non-payment rates
were high during the first few weeks, due to general
confusion and errors (such as motorists confusing
number 0 or 1 and the letter O or l), but these have
declined as users and operators gain experience.
This system is not considered optimal because:
• The fee is not based on how many miles a vehicle
is driven within the charging area.
• The fee is not time-variable, that is, the fee is not
higher during the most congested periods and
lower during less congested periods.
• The fee does not vary by location. It would be
more efficient to have higher rates on more con-
gested roads.
• The system has relatively high overhead costs.
• Transit service (particularly the underground rail
system) is crowded and unreliable, although this
is changing as bus service improves and pricing
revenue is used to upgrade the system.
Costs and revenues
The program was predicted to have the following
costs and revenues between 2001 and 2008,including
three years of development and five years of opera-
tion:
Table 1 shows the charging program’s originally pro-
jected costs and revenues. However, charge revenues
turned out to be lower, and penalty revenues higher
than anticipated – resulting in a net “gain”. The
2004/05 budget year is projected to earn £190 (instead
of £160) million in total revenues (£118 million in fees
and £72 million in fines),with £92 million in overhead
expenses, resulting in £97 million in net revenues.
Travel impacts
Transport for London, the local transport authority
and part of the city of London’s administration, and
various academic organizations established a five-
year monitoring program to evaluate the transport,
economic, social and environmental impacts of con-
gestion charging (see references for London Con-
gestion Charging Website).
Just over a million people enter central London dur-
ing a typical weekday morning peak (7–10 a.m.).
Over 85 percent of these trips are by public trans-
port. Prior to the congestion pricing program about
12 percent of peak-period trips were by private au-
tomobile. During the programs first few months au-
tomobile traffic declined about 20 percent (a reduc-
tion of about 20,000 vehicles per day), resulting in a
10 percent automobile mode share.
Most people who change their travel patterns due
to the charge transfer to public transport, particu-
larly bus. Some motorists who would otherwise 
drive through central London during peak periods
shift their route, travel time or destination. Others
shift mode to taxis, motorcycles, pedal cycles, or to
walking 
This has significantly increased traffic speeds within
the zone. Average traffic speed during charging days
(including time stopped at intersections) increased 37
percent,from 8 miles-per-hour (13 km/hr) prior to the
charge up to 11 miles-per-hour (17 kms/hr) after pric-
ing was introduced. Peak period congestion delays
declined about 30 percent, and bus congestion delays
declined 50 percent. Bus ridership increased 14 per-
cent and subway ridership about 1 percent.The third-
year annual report indicates that these improvements
are continuing (Transport for London 2005).
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Table 1 








Start up costs 180 36 
Operating costs 320  64 
Total cost,  2001 – 2003 500  100 
Charge revenues 690  138 
Penalty revenues 110  22 
Total annualized revenue,
2004 – 2008 800  160 
NPV = net present value.
   Source: Compilationby the author.CESifo DICE Report 3/2005 19
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Taxi travel costs declined significantly (by 20–40 per-
cent) due to reduced delays.Vehicles can cover more
miles per hour, so taxi and bus service productivity
(riders per day) and efficiency (cost per passenger-
mile) increased substantially. There has been some
increase in motorcycle, moped and bicycle travel,
and vendors have promoted these modes.
The program’s net revenues will be used to improve
public transit services,including more buses and ma-
jor renovations to the subway (“tube”) system,
which is widely agreed to be in need of significant re-
development.Bus service is being improved in many
ways, including an expanded bus lane system, with
enforced surveillance using a network of over 1,400
on-bus and roadside video cameras.
Public and political response
Before implementation this plan was widely criti-
cized by various interest groups, including politi-
cians, motorist groups and some labor organizations.
The Conservative mayor candidate promised to end
the program if elected.Many newspapers were skep-
tical or opposed to the program,and opponents pro-
duced a website titled Sod-U-Ken (see references)
to promote their objections.
The congestion pricing program has since become
generally accepted by the public and interest groups,
including many that initially criticized it,such as auto-
mobile clubs. Within a month of its start residents of
other areas in London began requesting to be includ-
ed, and the Conservative candidate no longer pro-
mised to end the fee. In 2004, Mayor Livingstone was
reelected, largely on the success of the road pricing
program and his plans to expand the pricing zone.
London First (see references),a business group whose
members account for 22 percent of the city’s GDP,
supports the city’s congestion charge. A survey per-
formed May 2003 found that its members consider the
scheme to have overall positive impacts on business
activity.The majority (69 percent) felt charging had no
impact on their business, 22 percent reported positive
impacts on their business,and only 9 percent reported
an overall negative impact. Many industries support
the charge because its direct costs are offset by savings
and benefits, such as faster delivery times. Cert
Logistics,a distribution company that delivers to many
downtown restaurants and hotels, reports its delivery
times have been cut by as much as 50 percent,and oth-
er industries find that their employees spend less time
delayed in traffic,and so can attend more out-of-office
meetings in a day.The £5 charge pays for itself in just
17 minutes of travel-time savings for employees earn-
ing average London wages (£34,000 per year), and
many city center employees earn far more.
London Chamber of Commerce (see references)
members have been more skeptical of the program.
A March 2003 survey found that many city center re-
tailers blame the charge for reduced sales (although
the Iraq war and its security measures, a temporary
closure of two subway lines, and a general economic
downturn also impacted local business activity), and
some threaten to leave the city. Opposition to the
program tends to be greater among smaller retailers,
and may partly reflect political ideology (the business
community tends to oppose Mayor Ken Livingstone
and his policies), and may represent a political strat-
egy to gain more special treatment to benefit local
retail businesses,such as lower parking fees and spe-
cial discounts.
Criticism
Some issues of criticism are discussed below.
Business activity
As mentioned above,some businesses consider them-
selves harmed by the program,particularly bulk good
retailers that rely on customers who drive private
cars.However,other economic activities have benefit-
ed due to improved access by other modes, reduced
delay for high-value vehicle trips, and improved envi-
ronmental conditions. A shift in the location of bulk
retailing is not necessarily harmful to the regional
economy if the city center locations they vacate are
used for equally productive activities.Economic theo-
ry suggests that congestion pricing should increase
overall productivity and business activity by favoring
higher-value activities over lower-value activities, and
reducing congestion costs.Some criticisms were based
on inaccurate assumptions (for example, theater pa-
tronage impacts are slight since the charge does not
apply evenings and weekends when most perfor-
mances occur), or were addressed by special treat-
ments (such as discounts for certain types of employ-
ees). Various studies and surveys indicate minimal
overall impact on economic productivity and activity,
although some sectors and businesses are affected
more than others, either positively or negatively
(Transport for London 2005).System accuracy
The congestion pricing system uses a network of
video cameras to record license plate numbers, and
optical character recognition (OCR) technology to
read this information, identify “unpaid” vehicles
and generate citations for violators. During the first
few weeks the rate of false positives (motorists
wrongly ticketed) was high, in part due to both dri-
vers and OCR systems misinterpreting characters or
using incorrect registration data. Failure rates have
declined over time as motorists and operators gain
experience.
Traffic spillover impacts
There was concern that congestion may increase on
nearby roads due to diverted traffic.Although some
diversion occurred the effect appears to be too small
to measure, and may be addressed in the future by
expanding the priced area and charging more vari-
able fees (higher rates in the center and lower rates
in outer zones). Although there is 10 percent more
traffic on the peripheral roads, journey times on
them have not increased, in part because traffic sig-
nal systems on these roads were adjusted in antici-
pation of these traffic shifts.
Fairness
Some critics argue that road pricing is unfair because
it constitutes “double charging”, since motorists al-
ready pay registration and fuel taxes and is unfair to
lower-income people who must drive, such as work-
ers who commute to central London during off-
hours. Some motorists are exempt (e.g., people with
disabilities) or have substantial discounts (residents
within the priced area) not available to others. This
criticism has raised debate concerning what pricing
is equitable and how reforms
can be most fair and beneficial
to consumers. Some concerns
have been addressed with spe-
cial exemptions or policies.
Pricing efficiency
Most economists favor a variable
road use fee that reflects the type
of vehicle, when it is driven,
where and how much it is driven
within the priced area, since that
most accurately reflects the costs
imposed by driving and gives motorists an incentive
to minimize their negative impacts, for example, by
shifting from peak to off-peak periods, or by mini-
mizing their mileage. The current system uses a flat
fee applied to any vehicle that drives within the cen-
tral area during weekdays,so once a motorist pays the
fee they have no incentive to minimize driving. This
flat-rate system was chosen because it was relatively
fast and easy to implement,and simple to understand.
A more sophisticated system that allows variable fees
is likely to be implemented in the future.
Cost efficiency
A substantial portion of revenue is used to pay pro-
gram expenses. About half of the program’s rev-
enues are spent on overhead costs (project develop-
ment, equipment and operations). Critics argue that
there are more cost effective ways to collect money.
However, as a congestion reduction strategy and a
way to improve bus service it has proven to be an ef-
fective and cost efficient investment.
Loss of privacy 
There is concern that the network of video cameras
and the system for tracking vehicles within London
is an invasion of privacy. However, British cities al-
ready have extensive video surveillance systems,and
access to vehicle location data is controlled to limit
invasion of privacy. However, these factors have not
eliminated this concern.
Winners and losers
Table 2 characterizes the groups which are either
winners or losers of London congestion pricing.
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 Table 2 
Congestionpricing: Winners and losers 
Winners Losers
• Downtown bus riders
• All transit riders (due to in-
creased funding for improve-
ments) 
• Taxi riders and drivers 
• Motorists with high-value trips
• Most city center businesses
• Overall city productivity 
• Pedestrians and cyclists
• Motorists with marginal-value
trips 
• City center businesses that
depend on low-cost weekday
car access 
• Residents and motorists in
border areas who experience
spillover impacts 
• City center parking revenue 
recipients
 Source: Author.CESifo DICE Report 3/2005 21
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Implications for other cities
London’s congestion pricing project is considered an
important test of the political feasibility of conges-
tion pricing in major democratic cities. London’s ex-
perience shows that congestion pricing is technically
feasible and effective, and that it is possible to over-
come the political and institutional resistance to such
pricing.As a result,it will help put congestion pricing
on the menu of transportation improvement options
in other cities.
This pricing program indicates that private automo-
bile travel is more price sensitive than most experts
believed.This is good news for congestion reduction
but bad news for revenue generation.
Better pricing systems are needed to optimize the
incentive, with prices that vary depending on the
type of vehicle, when, where and how much it is dri-
ven. These are technically feasible, and have been
implemented in Hong Kong and Singapore,but they
involve greater investments and potential loss of
privacy.
Implementation is not easy. It requires a suitable
combination of travel and political conditions, in-
cluding widely dispersed benefits and the ability
to overcome public skepticism. Compared with
other cities London has a particularly small por-
tion of automobile commuters, and many of them
reside outside the city. As a result, a relatively
large portion of voters perceive themselves as
benefiting from the fee.Voters in other cities may
be more skeptical that they will benefit from such
a fee.
Summary
Since 17 February 2003 the city of London has
charged a fee for driving private automobiles in its
central area during weekdays as a way to reduce
traffic congestion and raise revenues to fund trans-
port improvements. This has significantly reduced
traffic congestion,improved bus and taxi service and
generates substantial revenues. Public acceptance
has grown and there is now support to expand the
program to other parts of London and other cities in
the UK. This is the first congestion pricing program
in a major European city, and its success suggests
that congestion pricing may become more politically
feasible elsewhere.
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